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HOW PANELS AFFECT JUDGES: EVIDENCE FROM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Ahmed E. Taha *
Recent research has shown that judges on panels decide cases
differently than they do individually. Understanding these panel
effects is essential to understanding and predicting judicial behav-
ior. This Article uses a unique natural experiment, and interviews
of United States district court judges who participated in this ex-
periment, to empirically investigate panel effects. Specifically, in
fourteen district courts the judges chose to sit in an en banc panel
to decide the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines; in fifty-three other districts, the judges decided the issue in-
dividually instead. This Article compares the decisions and the
characteristics of these districts to study how panels affect judicial
decision making and to answer the related question of why federal
judges who have the authority to decide a case individually would
choose to do so as part of a panel instead.
Among the panel effects the Article finds is that judges in dis-
tricts that sat en banc were much more likely to be unanimous in
their voting and also were more likely to find the Guidelines un-
constitutional than were judges in other districts. In addition, it
appears that a primary purpose of sitting en banc was to obtain
these panel effects. Finally, the Article provides evidence of the ef-
fects of court structure and composition on judicial collegiality
and the propensity to sit en banc. Among the issues the Article ex-
amines are how the number of judges and the geographic dis-
tances between judges on a court affect judicial collegiality and the
likelihood that a court sits en banc.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent legal scholarship is discovering that when a judge is
part of a panel of judges that hears a case, the judge's decision is
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often greatly affected by the other members of the panel.' Under-
standing these "panel effects" is essential to understanding and
predicting judicial decision making. For example, judges on
United States courts of appeals ("courts of appeals") typically
hear cases as part of a three-judge panel.2 Recent empirical stud-
ies find that, in some areas of the law, the political orientation of
the other two judges on a panel is at least as good of a predictor of
a judge's vote as is the judge's own political orientation.3 Indeed,
a Republican judge4 sitting on a three-judge panel with two De-
mocratic judges is more likely to vote to uphold an affirmative ac-
tion program than is a Democratic judge sitting on a panel with
two Republican judges.' Thus, studies that ignore panel. effects
will misevaluate the effect of judges' political orientation on judi-
cial decision making.
Because judges on courts of appeals only hear cases as part of a
panel,6 these recent studies investigate the effect of panels by ex-
amining how judges' decision making differs when the composi-
tion of the panels they are on differs. For example, these studies
compare how a Democratic judge on a court of appeals votes when
she is on a panel with two other Democratic judges versus when
she is on a panel with two Republican judges.7
* Assistant Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. J.D., Ph.D.
Stanford University, 1996; B.A, B.S. University of Pennsylvania, 1988. I am very grateful
to the United States district court judges who agreed to be interviewed for this Article and
to Michael Heise, Andrew Morriss, and Gregory Sisk for access to their database. I also
appreciate the very helpful comments of Judge Earl Carroll, Judge Frank Coffin, Michael
Green, Judge Harry Hupp, Judge James King, Judge J. Frederick Motz, Alan Palmiter,
Wendy Parker, Gregory Sisk, Judge Deanell Tacha, Carl Tobias, Ronald Wright and the
WERL workshop at Washington University. I am also grateful to Damien Savoie for his
excellent research assistance.
1. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83
VA. L. REV. 1717, 1751-69 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal
Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 337-54 (2004).
2. See Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant
En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 214 (1999) (stating that United States courts of
appeals ("courts of appeals") sit en banc in less than one percent of their cases).
3. Revesz, supra note 1, at 1719; Sunstein et al., supra note 1, at 317.
4. A "Republican judge" is defined as a judge who was appointed by a Republican
president. A "Democratic judge" is a judge who was appointed by a Democratic president.
5. Sunstein et al., supra note 1, at 319; cf. Revesz, supra note 1, at 1719 (finding that
in environmental regulation cases before the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit "the party affiliation of the other judges on the panel has a
greater bearing on a judge's vote than his or her own affiliation").
6. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2000).
7. Revesz, supra note 1, at 1751-66; Sunstein et al., supra note 1, at 314-30.
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The present Article, however, takes advantage of a unique
natural experiment to investigate panel effects more directly. It
empirically examines the effect of being on a panel by comparing
the decisions of judges who decided an issue as members of a
panel to the decisions of judges who instead decided the same is-
sue individually. Specifically, it studies United States district
court ("district court") judges' decisions regarding the constitu-
tionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"). It
compares the decisions of judges who decided this issue as part of
an en banc panel in their district to the decisions of judges who
decided the issue individually instead.' In addition, to aid in in-
terpreting these results, this Article's empirical analyses are sup-
plemented by interviews of thirteen federal district judges who
participated in the en banc panels.9
Other studies of judicial behavior have analyzed judges' rulings
in actual cases.1° An inherent limitation of this approach, how-
ever, is the lack of comparability of the cases used in the analy-
ses: different judges are rarely faced with the same legal question
and factual situation. Using the decisions of hundreds of federal
district judges regarding the Guidelines' constitutionality pro-
vides a unique opportunity to avoid this problem. All of the cases
posed essentially the same legal question, which was unrelated to
the specific facts of each case: Are the Guidelines constitutional?1'
8. As will be detailed below, United States district courts ("district courts") have it
within their discretion to have all the judges in the district hear a case en banc, i.e., to
have all the judges in the district sit together to decide a case. See infra notes 44-53 and
accompanying text. These en banc panels should not be confused with three-judge district
court panels that must be convened when an action is brought "challenging the constitu-
tionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of any
statewide legislative body" or when otherwise required by Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a)
(2000).
9. Thirteen district court judges were interviewed via telephone and email from Oc-
tober 2002 to March 2003. Notes from these interviews are on file with the author.
10. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Ju-
dicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 265-73 (1995); Sunstein et
al., supra note 1, at 314-30.
11. Although the ultimate question-whether the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines") are constitutional-was the same in every case, the exact legal arguments
made by the parties sometimes differed. Sharing of legal briefs, however, was very com-
mon. The small group of attorneys who represented the government in these cases used
briefs containing substantially similar legal arguments, and a model defense brief was cir-
culated to defense counsel by the defense bar. Andrew P. Morriss, Michael Heise, and
Gregory C. Sisk, Private Interest, Public Interest, and Public Choice: An Empirical Analy-
sis of Signaling and Precedent in Judicial Opinions 16 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
20051 1237
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Because these decisions present such a unique natural experi-
ment, some researchers have also used them to study other as-
pects of judicial behavior. 12
Recent studies of panel effects have examined courts of ap-
peals. Unlike court of appeals judges, who are required to sit on
panels, judges in the district courts that sit en banc choose to do
so.13 This difference allows this Article to examine a related ques-
tion as well: Why would federal district judges, who have the au-
thority to decide a case individually, instead sometimes choose to
hear the case as part of a panel? In most federal districts, the
judges who had cases challenging the constitutionality of the
Guidelines decided the issue individually.14 In fourteen districts,
however, judges chose to decide the issue en banc instead. 5 In
addition to examining the effect of sitting on a panel, this Article
also studies which factors lead judges to sit en banc.
Among the Article's major findings is that judges who sat en
banc were much more likely to agree about whether the Guide-
lines were constitutional than were judges who decided the issue
individually. This propensity of en banc panels to be unanimous
is likely due to several factors. Judges in a panel discuss the case
with each other and thus may be more likely to reach a consensus
on the correct decision. In addition, this unanimity probably re-
flects go-along voting by some judges who, for a variety of rea-
sons, wish to avoid writing a dissent. Finally, districts with
greater collegiality, or that were otherwise more likely to reach
unanimous decisions, were probably also more likely to choose to
sit en banc.
The Article also finds that judges in districts that sat en banc
were more likely to find the Guidelines unconstitutional than
were judges who decided the issue independently. The greater
willingness to strike down the Guidelines as part of a panel may
12. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's "Unconstitu-
tional"About the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183, 190-97 (1991) (ana-
lyzing which factors affected how judges ruled on the Guidelines' constitutionality); Greg-
ory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of
Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1451-98 (1998); Ahmed E. Taha, Publish or
Paris? Evidence of How Judges Allocate Their Time, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 10-25 (2004)
(studying which factors affect whether judges publish their opinions).
13. The statutory authority for district courts to choose to sit en banc is discussed in-
fra text accompanying note 46.
14. See Sisk et al., supra note 12, at 1416 n.172.
15. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
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reflect a hesitance by judges to strike down such an important
federal policy without the support of their colleagues. This is es-
pecially true given the great political popularity of the Guidelines
at the time; some judges may perceive panels as providing politi-
cal cover for unpopular decisions.
These findings of panel effects also at least partly explain why
some districts chose to sit en banc. Districts that especially de-
sired that judges have a uniform policy toward the Guidelines
were more likely to choose to sit en bane because doing so would
be more likely to lead to uniformity.16 In addition, it is reasonable
to believe that judges who were leaning toward striking down the
Guidelines were more likely to desire the input-and the possible
political cover-from their colleagues that would come from sit-
ting en bane.
This Article also finds evidence that more collegial districts are
more likely to sit en banc. Although there is no single definition of
judicial collegiality, many judges have described collegiality simi-
larly. Representative is Judge Edwards's description of a collegial
court as one in which "judges have a common interest, as mem-
bers of the judiciary, in getting the law right, and that, as a re-
sult, we are willing to listen, persuade, and be persuaded, all in
an atmosphere of civility and respect."17
Many of the judges who were interviewed for this study em-
phasized the role of judicial collegiality in their district's decision
to sit en banc. The comments of these federal district judges echo
those of many judges on courts of appeals who have emphasized
the role of judicial collegiality in their own decision making.'"
16. En banc decisions of district courts are not binding even on the judges in the dis-
trict. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
17. Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 1639, 1645 (2003); see also FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING,
AND JUDGING 215 (1994) (defining collegiality as "[tihe deliberately cultivated attitude
among judges of equal status and sometimes widely differing views working in intimate,
continuing, open, and noncompetitive relationship with each other, which manifests re-
spect for the strengths of the others, restrains one's pride of authorship, while respecting
one's own deepest convictions, values patience in understanding and compromise in non-
essentials, and seeks as much excellence in the court's decision as the combined talents,
experience, insight, and energy of the judges permit").
18. Patricia M. Wald, Calendars, Collegiality, and Other Intangibles on the Courts of
Appeals, in THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 171, 178
(Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1989) (calling collegiality "all important" to
appellate courts); see also Edwards, supra note 17, at 1690 ("[C]ollegiality invokes the
2005] 1239
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Despite its importance, however, the role of collegiality has
been given little attention in studies of judicial decision making.
As a result, empirical studies of judicial decision making have
been "inherently suspect, because they fail to account for the ef-
fects of collegiality on judicial decision making .... [C]ollegiality
merits serious discussion to generate a fuller understanding of
judicial decision making." 9 Collegiality significantly affects the
quality of courts' opinions and the development of the law.2 °
Scholars lack access to judicial deliberations in which the ef-
fects of collegiality could be directly observed.21 As a result, most
of the discussions of collegiality come from judges who participate
in decisions as part of a panel, although even these discussions
generally have not been rigorous.22
This Article, however, studies a specific group context that al-
lows for an empirical analysis of the factors that affect collegiality
and of collegiality's effect on judicial decision making. This Article
examines a number of measurable characteristics of a court's
structure and composition that could impact collegiality. By em-
pirically examining the relationship between these characteristics
and the likelihood of sitting en banc, and by supplementing this
with interviews of many of the judges who participated in these
highest ideals and aspirations of judging."); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The
Court En Banc: 1981-1990, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1008, 1017 (1991) ("In all the courts of
appeals, the judges must value collegiality, if only because an individual circuit judge has
little authority when acting alone; any substantive decision requires the concurrence of at
least two judges.").
19. Edwards, supra note 17, at 1641, 1643; see also id. at 1643 ("[S]cholars have not
afforded collegiality the attention it deserves.").
20. COFFIN, supra note 17, at 213, 216 ("I can think of no other contemporary institu-
tion that brings to every decision this degree of intimate, equal, permanent, independent,
and single-minded collegiality .... Collegiality enhances quality, as its absence diminishes
quality."); FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL
APPELLATE BENCH 172 (1980) ("[Clollegiality has much to do with the flavor, quality,
and-at their best-the wisdom of appellate opinions ... ."); Wald, supra note 18, at 182
("[W]e judges need to think and care more about our collegial relationships. They affect
the law we produce in significant and often unpredictable ways."); Edwards, supra note
17, at 1640-41 ("[Clollegiality mitigates judges' ideological preferences and enables us to
find common ground and reach better decisions."); Michael R. Murphy, Collegiality and
Technology, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 455, 456 (2000) ("The product of a collegial court,
its opinions, are 'better in substance, style, and tone' than those of a court which expends
little effort to harmonize diverse views.") (quoting COFFIN, supra note 17, at 228).
21. Edwards, supra note 17, at 1643.
22. Id. at 1641-42 ("[D]iscussions of collegiality, mostly by judges, have been brief and
suggestive, usually introduced only in passing. No one has attempted a comprehensive,
sustained treatment of collegiality .... ).
1240 [Vol. 39:1235
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decisions, this Article provides evidence of the effect of these
characteristics on judicial collegiality and on the decision to sit en
banc.
This Article's findings are also relevant to other courts. For ex-
ample, there has been much discussion regarding changing the
structure of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, including even proposals to split the Ninth Circuit into
smaller circuits. The congressionally created Commission on
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals recom-
mended organizing the Ninth Circuit into three smaller adjudica-
tive divisions," in part because the Commission believed that
"when an appellate court operating as a single decisional unit
reaches eighteen judgeships, the en banc process becomes too
cumbersome to be feasible."24 This Article contributes information
that is important to this debate. For example, it finds that even
small geographic distances between judges deter some courts
from sitting en banc. This result appears to be due both to the
greater logistic difficulties in convening an en banc panel in such
a court and because judges who are able to see each other more
often tend to be more collegial and thus more willing to hear a
case en banc.
This Article also finds that courts with fewer judges are not
more likely to sit en banc than are larger courts. This may be be-
cause obtaining the aggregate input of the other judges is more
valuable in a large court or because having the entire court decide
an issue en banc, rather than having each judge decide it sepa-
rately, leads to greater resource savings in districts with a large
number of judges. In addition, the Article finds that districts in
which there has been recent addition of judges, and thus less fa-
miliarity among the judges, are less likely to sit en banc.
Finally, it should be noted that although en banc hearings in
district courts occur rarely,25 they have very recently received ad-
ditional attention. In its June 2004 decision, Blakely v. Washing-
ton,26 the Supreme Court of the United States found that the
23. COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL
REP. 40 (1998). Congress created the Commission to recommend reforms of United States
courts of appeals. Id. at 2.
24. Id. at 61.
25. See infra text accompanying note 34.
26. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
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Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial prevented judges from us-
ing many factors in sentencing unless the jury found those factors
were present.27 This has led many courts and commentators to
question whether the Guidelines are still valid.28 In response to
these concerns, at least one district court was asked to decide the
issue en banc.29 The effects of sitting en banc and the factors that
affected courts' decisions to sit en banc to decide the Guidelines'
constitutionality earlier are also likely to be relevant today.
In Part II of this Article, a brief overview of en banc proceed-
ings in district courts provides necessary background informa-
tion. Part III describes the Article's data and empirical methodol-
ogy, including a description of the variables that are examined
and the reasons to expect that they may be related to whether a
district sits en banc. The results of this empirical analysis and
their implications will be discussed in Part IV. Part V summa-
rizes and concludes the Article.
II. EN BANC PROCEEDINGS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS
In courts of appeals, cases are normally heard by a panel of
three judges.3 ° En banc proceedings are very atypical; less than
one percent of circuit court decisions are reviewed en banc.31 Nev-
ertheless, the procedure for hearing a case en banc is well-
established. A majority of the circuit's active judges can choose to
have an appeal heard or a panel's decision reviewed en banc by
all of the circuit's active judges and any senior judge who served
on the original panel.32 The original panel's decision, if it exists, is
vacated and replaced with the en banc court's decision.33
27. Id. at 2538-41.
28. See, e.g., A Supreme Mess, WASH. POST, July 15, 2004, at A20 (stating that Blakely
"casts grave constitutional doubt on sentencing rules throughout the country, including
federal sentencing guidelines").
29. Jay Weaver, Judges Asked to Assess Ruling, MIAMI HERALD, July 17, 2004, at 4B
(stating a defense attorney has filed a motion asking the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida to sit en banc to declare the Guidelines unconstitutional
in light of the Blakely decision).
30. See supra text accompanying note 2.
31. 2002 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., JUD. BUS. OF THE U.S. CTS.: ANN. REP. OF THE
DIRECTOR 37 tbl.S-1.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2000); FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
33. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 35(c); 11TH CIR. R. 35-10.
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In district courts, en banc proceedings are much rarer. Instead,
a single judge typically presides over a case. District courts, how-
ever, sat en banc approximately thirty-three times from 1928 to
1987. 34 In 1988, however, there was a relative flood of en banc de-
cisions by district courts. 35 After having made a total of thirty-
three en banc decisions over the previous sixty years, federal dis-
trict courts issued fourteen en banc decisions in 1988 deciding the
constitutionality of the Guidelines.36
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act, 37 dra-
matically changing federal criminal sentencing. Among the Act's
most important provisions was the creation of the United States
Sentencing Commission, an independent agency in the judiciary
with the mandate to establish guidelines for federal judges to use
in sentencing.3 The Sentencing Reform Act requires the Commis-
sion to develop categories of offender and offense characteristics
and create a relatively narrow range of permissible sentences for
each combination of these categories. 39 After congressional re-
view, these Guidelines became effective on November 1, 1987.40
In many jurisdictions, however, the Guidelines did not take ef-
fect until much later because of separation of powers and due
34. John R. Bartels, United States District Courts En Banc-Resolving the Ambigui-
ties, 73 JUDICATURE 40, 40 (1989). Although Judge Bartels was able to find thirty-three en
banc decisions, there were probably more. Some unpublished decisions would be almost
impossible to discover. Because of their importance, however, it is likely that most en banc
district court decisions are published. For example, ten of the fourteen en banc decisions
on the Guidelines' constitutionality were published. See infra note 36.
35. See Bartels, supra note 34, at 40.
36. See United States v. Allen, 685 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ala. 1988); United States v.
Bogle, 689 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D. Fla. 1988); United States v. Bolding, 683 F. Supp. 1003 (D.
Md. 1988); United States v. Brittman, 687 F. Supp. 1329 (E.D. Ark. 1988); United States
v. Christman, Cr. 88-4-2 (D. Vt. Nov. 19, 1988); United States v. Gentry, Criminal No. 87-
50062-01 (W.D. La. June 22, 1988); United States v. Harris, No. 88-CR-6-B (N.D. Okl. Apr.
28, 1988); United States v. Johnson, 68 F. Supp. 1033 (W.D. Mo. 1988); United States v.
Macias-Pedroza, 694 F. Supp. 1406 (D. Ariz. 1988); United States v. Ortega Lopez, 684 F.
Supp. 1506 (C.D. Cal. 1988); United States v. Serpa, 688 F. Supp. 1398 (D. Neb. 1988);
United States v. Stokley, Criminal Action No. 2:87-00206 (S.D. W. Va. July 8, 1988);
United States v. Swapp, 695 F. Supp. 1140 (D. Utah 1988); United States v. Williams, 691
F. Supp. 36 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
37. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987-2040
(codified in scattered sections in titles 18 and 28 of the United State Code).
38. Pub. L. No. 98-473 tit. II, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 2019 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 994 (2000)).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (2000).
40. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 (2004).
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process challenges to their constitutionality.41 From November
1987 to January 1989, almost 300 federal district judges ruled on
the Guidelines' constitutionality, most of them holding the Guide-
lines unconstitutional.4 2 As a result, the Guidelines did not be-
come binding in all districts until January 18, 1989, when the
Supreme Court of the United States upheld their constitutional-
ity.4
3
En banc panels of district courts should not be confused with
the three-judge district court panels that must be convened when
an action is brought "challenging the constitutionality of the ap-
portionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of
any statewide legislative body" or when otherwise required by
Congress.' Rather, district court en banc panels are those in
which all judges in a particular district court sit together to de-
cide a particular case. These en banc panels are not mandatory;
the judges in a district have complete discretion regarding
whether to sit en banc.45
Statutory authority for district courts to choose to sit en banc is
at least implicitly granted by 28 U.S.C. § 132(c), which provides
that "[elxcept as otherwise provided by law, or rule or order of
court, the judicial power of a district court with respect to any ac-
tion, suit or proceeding may be exercised by a single judge."46 No
statute, however, describes the procedure for calling for a district
court to sit en banc. As a result, different district courts have
used different procedures. A review of district courts' en banc de-
cisions indicates that some en banc panels were formed at the re-
quest of the judge assigned to the case,47 others were formed at
the request of the district's chief judge,4" and even some were
formed at the request of the parties in the case.49 The interviews
of judges conducted for this Article found that courts did not fol-
low a formal procedure in choosing to sit en banc to decide the
41. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
42. Sisk et al., supra note 12, at 1382.
43. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (2000).
45. See Bartels, supra note 34, at 40-41.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 132(c) (2000) (emphasis added).
47. E.g., Smith v. Baldi, 96 F. Supp. 100, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
48. E.g., Lucas v. Schiffahrts Ges. Franz Lange G.m.b.H. & Co., 379 F. Supp. 759, 760
(E.D. Pa. 1974).
49. Bartels, supra note 34, at 41.
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constitutionality of the Guidelines.5" To the best recollection of
the interviewed judges, all the judges in a district simply reached
a consensus to hear the case en banc after one judge in the dis-
trict suggested sitting en banc.51
In addition, no formal guidance exists regarding what type of
case should be heard en banc by a district court.52 As Judge
Bartels observed, however, district courts have advanced four jus-
tifications for calling an en banc panel: "1) commonality of the
facts and the legal issue; 2) uniform treatment for similarly situ-
ated litigants, while fostering intracourt comity; 3) conservation
of scarce judicial, governmental and private resources; [and] 4) is-
sues that, as a matter of law and public concern, are particularly
serious." "
An examination of many of the en banc decisions prior to the
Guidelines decisions illustrates the type of cases that courts have
found to satisfy these criteria. The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania sat en banc in 1937 to
hear a petition by the National Cash Register Company to re-
claim from a bankruptcy trustee a cash register that the bank-
rupt party possessed at the time of the bankruptcy.5 4 The Na-
tional Cash Register Company claimed that it was entitled to
recover the cash register because the bankrupt party received it
under a bailment lease contract, which was now in default.55 The
court chose to hear the case en banc because the "case presents a
question with which referees in bankruptcy are now confronted in
almost every bankruptcy case. There should be a uniform rule of
decision and the parties not left to the accident of to whom the
cause is referred or the judge who hears the petition for review.""
In 1980, the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida sat en banc to hear motions to dismiss eighty-four
50. See supra note 9.
51. Id.
52. In contrast, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide explicit guidance for
when a court of appeals should meet en banc: "[an en banc hearing or rehearing is not fa-
vored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en banc consideration is necessary to
secure or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or (2) the proceeding involves a
question of exceptional importance." FED R. App. P. 35(a).
53. Bartels, supra note 34, at 42 (footnotes omitted).
54. In re Stein, 17 F. Supp. 587, 588 (E.D. Pa. 1936).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 589-90.
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indictments against 336 defendants accused of transporting or
conspiring to transport illegal aliens into the United States." The
defendants were all involved in the "Cuban Refugee Freedom Flo-
tilla" in 1980 in which over 125,000 Cuban nationals were trans-
ported from Mariel, Cuba to Key West, Florida.5" The court stated
that the primary reason for sitting en banc regarding these cases
was the "commonality of the facts and the legal issue set forth" in
the motions to dismiss the indictments.59 It said that these com-
mon issues should be handled uniformly by all the judges in the
district, especially because the cases involved potential criminal
sanctions.6 ° The court also pointed out that this uniformity would
be consistent with the doctrine of intra-court comity, "a general
rule that, absent unusual or exceptional circumstances, judges of
coordinate jurisdiction within a jurisdiction should follow breth-
ren judges' rulings."61 Finally, the court noted that because of the
commonality of the facts and the legal issue in the cases, hearing
them en banc would "limit unnecessary duplication of effort
thereby conserving scarce judicial, governmental and private re-
sources" that would be expended if each case was decided indi-
vidually by different judges.62
Another example of the use of en banc hearing to achieve uni-
formity on an important and recurring issue is Dondi Properties
Corporation v. Commerce Savings and Loan Association.6 ' There,
two unrelated cases in which attorney misconduct had allegedly
occurred were consolidated in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas so that the court could adopt en
banc standards of litigation conduct for attorneys in civil cases in
the district.64
In addition, in White v. Swenson,65 the United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri sat en banc to decide a
habeas corpus petition filed by a state prisoner.66 "Because vari-
57. United States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289, 292 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 293.
60. Id. ("Where, as here, criminal sanctions are involved, the significance of uniform-
ity, from both an individual and societal point of view, cannot be understated.").
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 121 F.R.D. 284 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
64. Id. at 285.
65. 261 F. Supp. 42 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
66. Id. at 44.
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ous facets of the general problem of state and federal court juris-
diction are frequently presented to this Court," the court chose to
"state in some detail in this memorandum opinion of this Court
en banc the principles that control the exercise of our federal ha-
beas corpus jurisdiction."67
As noted above, challenges to the constitutionality of the
Guidelines resulted in a relative flood of en banc hearings by dis-
trict courts. 68 After sitting en banc just thirty-three times in the
previous sixty years, fourteen district courts sat en banc in 1988
to decide the Guidelines' constitutionality.69 The great propensity
for the Guidelines' constitutionality to be decided en banc is un-
surprising because these cases satisfy all four justifications for en
banc proceedings that Judge Bartels identified.7"
First, as discussed above, all these cases posed essentially the
same legal question-whether the Guidelines are constitutional-
which was unrelated to the specific facts of each case. Second,
similarly situated defendants in the same district could receive
markedly different sentences if judges in the district differed in
whether they applied the Guidelines.71 For example,72 a judge
who does not apply the Guidelines could, under the federal bank
robbery statute, impose any prison sentence from zero to ten
years on someone who committed a nonviolent $500,000 robbery
of a federally insured bank.73 If the judge instead applied the
Guidelines, the judge could be required to impose a sentence of
between thirty-three and forty-one months.74 Third, in many dis-
tricts, challenges to the Guidelines' constitutionality arose in
67. Id.
68. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
70. See Bartels, supra note 34, at 42.
71. Paul J. Hofer et al., The Effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge
Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 256 (1999).
72. This example is provided in Andrew D. Goldstein, What Feeney Got Right: Why
Courts of Appeals Should Review Sentencing Departures De Novo, 113 YALE L.J. 1955,
1959-60 (2004).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (2000).
74. Goldstein, supra note 72, at 1960. The exact sentencing range required by the
Guidelines depends on factors such as the robber's criminal history and details of the of-
fense. Id.; see also Michael S. Gelacak et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: An Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299, 301 (1996)
(noting that the Guidelines' significant reduction in judicial sentencing discretion "was,
and remains, highly controversial").
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cases presided over by different judges.7" Each time a judge heard
a challenge to the Guidelines, parties presented their arguments
to the judge in writing or orally. En banc proceedings require only
one presentation and decision per district, potentially saving liti-
gants' and judges' resources.76 Fourth, the Guidelines raised sig-
nificant separation of powers and due process issues,77 and be-
cause the Guidelines dramatically changed federal sentencing
they were also of great public concern.7"
The degree to which the issue of the Guidelines' constitutional-
ity satisfied these four criteria differed across districts. This Arti-
cle empirically examines whether these criteria and other factors
help explain why some districts decided the Guidelines' constitu-
tionality en banc, while others did not.
Other researchers have studied which factors affect whether
courts of appeals hear cases en banc. For example, Professor
George found that three factors largely account for which panel
decisions will be reheard en banc: the three-judge panel's reversal
of a lower court or agency ruling, the filing of a dissent in the
panel decision, and a liberal panel ruling.7" Such findings, how-
ever, are inapplicable to the present study; none of the district
court en banc decisions regarding the Guidelines was a rehearing
of a decision.
75. For example, in the District of Kansas, four judges separately heard challenges to
the Guidelines' constitutionality. United States v. Boyd, No. 87-30025-01, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17091 (D. Kan. July 22, 1988) (Rogers, J.); United States v. Sistrunk, No. 88-
20025-01, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17053 (D. Kan. July 21, 1988) (O'Connor, C.J.); United
States v. Bryant, No. 88-10036-01, 1988 U.S. District LEXIS 17079 (D. Kan. July 14, 1988)
(Crow, J.); United States v. Tolbert, 682 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Kan. 1988) (Kelly, J.).
76. Bartels, supra note 34, at 42.
77. See Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law Per-
spective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1, 23-40 (1991) (discuss-
ing many of the constitutional issues raised by the Guidelines).
78. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989) (calling the Guidelines' con-
stitutionality an issue of "imperative public importance"); Cohen, supra note 12, at 188
(noting that judges' rulings on the Guidelines' constitutionality were receiving attention
from the legal community and typically even from the local press); Todd E. Witten, Com-
ment, Sentence Entrapment and Manipulation: Government Manipulation of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AKRON L. REV. 697, 705 (1996) ("Since their enactment, the
guidelines have had a substantial impact on the federal court system. Accordingly, they
have been the subject of harsh criticism from commentators and members of the federal
judiciary.").
79. George, supra note 2, at 220; see also Douglas H. Ginsburg & Brian M. Boynton,
The Court En Banc: 1991-2002, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 259, 264 (2002) (finding that
whether the original panel heard oral argument and whether there was a dissent from the
decision of the original panel are important predictors of whether a decision will be re-
heard en banc).
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This distinction is important. Courts of appeals generally use
en banc panels to review decisions of a three-judge panel of the
same court of appeals. The decisions of these three-judge panels
are binding on the rest of the judges on the court unless the deci-
sion is overturned by the Supreme Court of the United States or
by an en banc panel of the same court of appeals.80 Thus, judges
on courts of appeals can use en banc panels to reverse decisions
made by a three-judge panel with which they disagree."1 At the
call of the majority of the circuit's active judges, a three-judge
panel's decision is reviewed en banc. 2 The original panel's deci-
sion is then vacated and replaced with the en banc court's deci-
sion."
En banc panels by district courts, however, are not used to re-
view the decision of a federal district judge. In addition, these en
banc decisions are not binding authority even on judges in the
district.' 4 As will be discussed below, however, for the sake of uni-
formity in the district's law, even dissenting judges sometimes
agree to be bound by the en banc decisions.
These differences between en banc decisions by courts of ap-
peals and by district courts mean that the motivation for sitting
en banc differs. Thus, some factors that explain courts of appeals'
decisions to sit en banc are unlikely to explain district courts' de-
cisions to do so, and vice versa. Other factors-such as the logisti-
cal difficulties of convening a court en banc-should affect both
types of courts. Part III of this Article examines which factors ex-
plain why some district courts sat en banc to decide the Guide-
lines' constitutionality while judges in other districts sat indi-
vidually. In the course of the Article, the applicability of some of
these factors to courts of appeals' decisions to sit en banc will also
be discussed.
80. See, e.g., Indus. Turnaround Corp. v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 1997).
81. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 18, at 1033.
82. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
83. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 35(c); 11TH CIR. R. 35-9.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 682 F. Supp. 1033, 1038-39 (W.D. Mo. 1988)
(Wright, J., dissenting) (dissenting from United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Missouri's en banc holding that the Guidelines are constitutional and stating that
he personally will "utilize the Guidelines strictly on an advisory basis").
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III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
This Part describes the data and empirical methodology used
in this Article to study panel effects and the related question of
why some district courts choose to sit en banc.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines took effect on November 1,
1987.5 However, their constitutionality was quickly challenged in
district courts throughout the country. 6 This Article uses the 293
decisions by federal district judges regarding the Guidelines' con-
stitutionality that were compiled by Professors Sisk, Heise, and
Morriss from (1) a list of decisions that the U.S. Sentencing
Commission assembled from attorneys and courts involved in the
cases, (2) a search of WESTLAW and LEXIS, and (3) contacting
some courts directly.17 Of these decisions, 188 were made by
judges in fifty-three district courts who decided the Guidelines'
constitutionality on their own; the remaining 105 of these deci-
sions were part of en banc decisions made in fourteen district
courts.8 8
This Article studies the effect of sitting en banc on judicial de-
cision making. It also studies whether differences in the extent to
which districts satisfied the four criteria cited by Judge Bartels8 9
and satisfied other criteria help explain which district courts sat
en banc. To accomplish these related goals, the Article examines
a number of quantifiable variables that may be correlated with
whether a district court sat en banc. These variables are defined
in Table 1. They reflect characteristics of a particular district
court's decisions regarding the Guidelines' constitutionality, as
well as many aspects of the court's structure, composition, and
caseload.
85. See supra text accompanying note 40.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
87. Sisk et al., supra note 12, at 1407-08. Their compilation omits three decisions: one
by a court of appeals judge sitting by designation on a district court, one by a judge in the
Virgin Islands, and one that was erroneously included in the Sentencing Commission's
list. Id. at 1408 n.143. Despite these omissions, their study reports 294, not 293, decisions
by district court judges regarding the Guidelines' constitutionality. Professor Sisk's and
my efforts to account for the difference in our courts was unsuccessful.
88. Id. at 1408-09.
89. Bartels, supra note 34, at 42. Recall that these criteria are: "1) commonality of the
facts and the legal issue; 2) uniform treatment for similarly situated litigants, while fos-
tering intracourt comity; 3) conservation of scarce judicial, governmental and private re-
sources; [and] 4) issues that, as a matter of law and public concern, are particularly seri-
ous." Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Table 1: Definition of Variables
Variable Definition
Unanimity90 Judges in district express unanimous view on
Guidelines' constitutionality (1=yes, 0=no)
Strike Guidelines91 Majority of judges who express a view declare the
Guidelines unconstitutional (1=yes, 0=no)
Criminal Cases92 Number of criminal cases terminated in district
(fiscal year 1988)
Same City93  All active judges' chambers in same city(1=yes, 0=no)
Number of Judges94  Number of active judges in district
Caseload95  Weighted caseload in district per judge(fiscal year 1988)
Number of days between most recently appointed
Judicial Turnover judge taking office and the first decision in the
district regarding the Guidelines' constitutionality
The remainder of this section discusses how each of these vari-
ables might relate to whether a particular district court sat en
banc to decide the Guidelines' constitutionality.
90. Whether the judges in a district were unanimous regarding the Guidelines' consti-
tutionality was obtained directly from the decisions. See Sisk et al., supra note 12, at
1407-09.
91. Whether a majority of the judges struck down the Guidelines was obtained di-
rectly from the decisions. See id.
92. The number of criminal cases in a district is from the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts. See 1989 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR 11-12
[hereinafter 1989 ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR].
93. The location of judges' chambers is from West Group's Federal Supplement. See
Judges of the Federal Courts, 700 F. Supp. VII-XXXII (1989).
94. The number of judges in the district is from West Group's Federal Supplement.
See id.
95. The judges' caseload is from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. See 1989
ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR, supra note 92, at 11-12.
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A. Unanimity
As noted above, recent empirical research has shown the exis-
tence of large panel effects: judges on panels are often greatly in-
fluenced by their colleagues.96 These panel effects include both
"ideological dampening" and "ideological amplification." Ideologi-
cal dampening is the phenomenon of judges voting less consistent
with their own political ideology when they are on a panel with
judges of a different political ideology.97 An example of ideological
dampening is the finding that on a three-judge court of appeals
panel, in some areas of the law, a Democratic judge sitting with
two Republican judges will cast a politically liberal vote less often
than if that judge is sitting on a panel with one Democratic judge
and one Republican judge.9"
Ideological amplification is the phenomenon of judges voting
even more consistently with their own political ideology when
they are on a panel with judges of the same political ideology.99
An example of ideological amplification is the finding that, in
some areas of the law, a Democratic judge sitting with two other
Democratic judges will vote liberally more often than if the judge
is sitting with one Democratic judge and one Republican judge.' °°
These panel effects can be dramatic. In some areas of law, the
political orientation of the other judges on a panel is an even bet-
ter predictor of a judge's vote than is the judge's own political ori-
entation. For example, Professor Sunstein's collaborative study
found that Republican judges sitting on a three-judge court of ap-
peals panel with two Democratic judges are actually more likely
to vote to uphold an affirmative action program than are Democ-
ratic judges sitting on a panel with two Republican judges.'0 '
There are likely several reasons for the existence of such panel
effects. First, judges on a panel might be genuinely persuaded by
the views of the other panel members. In addition, a judge on a
panel may vote with the majority even if the judge disagrees with
the majority's decision. Such "go-along" voting occurs in panels on
96. See supra text accompanying notes 1-7.
97. Sunstein et al., supra note 1, at 304, 316-17.
98. E.g., Revesz, supra note 1, at 1753 tbl.10.
99. Sunstein et al., supra note 1, at 304.
100. Id. at 304-05.
101. Id. at 319.
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courts of appeals." 2 Custom dictates that a dissenting judge write
a dissenting opinion and thus it is not unusual for a judge who
disagrees, although not passionately, with the majority's opinion
to nevertheless vote with the majority to avoid having to write a
dissenting opinion. 103 Go-along voting may also be motivated by
the usual human tendency to make one's views conform to the
views of others." 4 Judges, like other people, likely prefer to be in
agreement with their colleagues.
Go-along voting may have been especially likely on the district
court en banc panels that decided the Guidelines' constitutional-
ity. Although the Guidelines evoked strong views from judges,0 5
it seemed likely that the Supreme Court of the United States
would soon rule on the Guidelines' constitutionality. 106 Thus po-
tentially dissenting district court judges reasonably may have be-
lieved that their respective district's en banc decision would not
have long-term consequences, making it even less worthwhile to
dissent. In addition, because a primary reason for ruling on the
Guidelines en banc was to encourage a uniform sentencing policy
in the district,0 7 some judges may have engaged in go-along vot-
ing to ensure a uniform sentencing policy in the district. If some
judges in a district applied the Guidelines while others did not,
then whether a defendant would be subject to the Guidelines
would depend upon which judge was randomly assigned to the de-
fendant's case.
Regardless of which reasons are responsible for panel effects in
a particular situation, the ultimate impact is that judges' votes
102. Richard A. Posner, What do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 20 (1993).
103. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 123 (1995).
104. See Sunstein et al., supra note 1, at 342.
105. James Zagel & Adam Winkler, The Independence of Judges, 46 MERCER L. REV.
795, 833 (1995) ("When Congress took much of Ijudges' sentencing] discretion away with
the federal sentencing guidelines, the protests of judges were anguished, sincere, and
widespread.. ").
106. Indeed, because of the importance of the question of the Guidelines' constitutional-
ity and the "disarray" among sentencing courts regarding their constitutionality, the Su-
preme Court of the United States took the unusual step of granting certiori even before
the court of appeals had issued a judgment in a case. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 371 (1989).
107. United States v. Allen, 685 F. Supp. 827, 828 (N.D. Ala. 1988) ("Because of the de-
sirability of consistency, the judges of this court-like those in several other districts-
have elected to consider collectively [the guidelines' constitutionality].") (footnotes omit-
ted).
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are influenced by the other members of the panel. A judge who
sits on a panel will be more likely to vote the same as other
judges on the panel than the judge would if the judge decided the
case individually. Therefore, one can predict that federal judges
who decide a case as part of an en banc panel are more likely to
reach a unanimous decision than they would if they each decided
the case separately.
Panel effects lead to the prediction that sitting en banc will
make federal district judges more likely to vote unanimously.
Federal district judges on en banc panels may also be more likely
to vote unanimously because more collegial districts may be more
likely to choose to sit en banc. Recall that the definition that
many judges give to collegiality includes a willingness to listen to
and be persuaded by the arguments of one's colleagues.' Thus,
judges in a collegial district may be more likely to agree on the
Guidelines' constitutionality because they are more likely to
reach a consensus on controversial topics than are less collegial
districts." 9 If more collegial districts are also more likely to
choose to sit en banc, then there should be an especially strong
positive correlation between sitting en banc and reaching a
unanimous decision on the Guidelines' constitutionality.
Finally, note that if judges believe that pressure for unanimity
exists in an en banc setting-for example, that the district will
have a uniform sentencing policy-then judges who suspect that
their views regarding the Guidelines' constitutionality are in the
minority in the district might oppose hearing the case en banc.
Thus, courts in which all the judges agree regarding the Guide-
lines' constitutionality might be more likely to also agree to sit en
banc.
For all these reasons, districts that sat en banc to decide the
Guidelines' constitutionality should have been more likely to be
unanimous than were the districts in which judges individually
decided the issue instead.
108. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
109. See COFFIN, supra note 17, at 224-25 (calling dissenting and concurring opinions
"ruptures in the cloak of consensus ordinarily worn by collegiality," and calling a court's
long history of unanimous opinions "a testament to the efficacy of real collegial interaction
in reaching a result all can accept").
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B. Majority Vote to Strike Down the Guidelines
For two reasons, districts in which a majority of judges voted to
strike down the Guidelines may have been more likely to sit en
banc. First, deciding the Guidelines' constitutionality as part of
an en banc panel may have made some judges more willing to
vote to strike down the Guidelines. Second, districts in which
many judges suspected that they would find the Guidelines un-
constitutional may have been more likely to choose to sit en banc.
Federal district judges likely were reluctant to strike down the
Guidelines. Many judges are hesitant in general to invalidate
statutes," ° and the Guidelines were promulgated pursuant to the
federal Sentencing Reform Act."' This reluctance might be par-
ticularly high when the statute has a very large effect on public
policy, such as the Guidelines' dramatic change of federal sen-
tencing policy." 2
Judges were likely especially hesitant to strike down the
Guidelines because the Guidelines were politically very popular.
For example, both the Democratic and Republican presidential
nominees at the time-George H.W. Bush and Michael Dukakis-
publicly supported the Guidelines. 3 Prior empirical research has
found that this political popularity made many judges reluctant
to strike down the Guidelines. All else equal, judges with a
greater probability of promotion to courts of appeals were more
likely to uphold the Guidelines than were other judges."'
Sitting en banc may have made some judges more willing to
strike down the Guidelines. Some judges might have felt empow-
ered by having colleagues who were also voting to strike them
down. If a judge's colleagues favored striking down the Guide-
lines, then some judges might follow their own inclination to do so
110. See, e.g., Gregory S. Crespi, Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the Creation of a
Futures Market in Bodily Organs, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 63 (1994) (noting courts' reluctance
to invalidate acts of Congress).
111. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987-2040
(codified in scattered sections in titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code).
112. Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors As Sentencers, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2004) (describing the Guidelines as a cause of the 'both radical and
reactionary" transformation that the federal sentencing system has undergone since
1984).
113. Cohen, supra note 12, at 195.
114. Id. at 193; Sisk et al., supra note 12, at 1488-90.
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as well.'15 In addition, voting to strike down the politically popu-
lar Guidelines as part of an en banc decision rather than indi-
vidually might be perceived as providing some political cover to
judges. A judge's vote to strike down the Guidelines would appear
as only one of a number of judges' votes in the case.
For the same reasons, districts in which many judges were at
least preliminarily inclined to strike down the Guidelines may
have been more likely to choose to sit en banc. Before holding the
Guidelines unconstitutional, such judges might have desired the
input of their colleagues that an en banc panel provides. In addi-
tion, some judges may also have wanted the political cover that
would come from striking down Guidelines as part of an en banc
panel rather than individually.
C. Number of Criminal Cases
The more defendants who could be sentenced under the Guide-
lines, the greater the importance of uniform treatment of defen-
dants, and the greater the public concern regarding whether the
Guidelines are constitutional. Thus, all else equal, districts with
more criminal cases should have been more likely to decide the
Guidelines' constitutionality en banc.
D. All Judges' Chambers in Same City
For two reasons, it is reasonable to expect that districts in
which all judges have their chambers in the same city will be
more likely to sit en banc. First, it is easier logistically to gather
all the judges in a district to hear and discuss a case if all the
judges' chambers are in the same city. Many of the en banc deci-
sions regarding the Guidelines' constitutionality were preceded
by oral argument, and the judges also met after the argument to
discuss the case. 1 6 Logistical considerations dictated that almost
115. See Sunstein et al., supra note 1, at 342 ("If other people seem to share your
view... you are likely to become more confident that you are correct ...
116. See supra note 9.
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all the en banc hearings were held in the city where most judges
had their chambers.
117
Second, judges who are geographically closer together are more
likely to regularly interact with each other. Greater collegiality
between judges may result from more frequent interaction. 8 In
turn, this collegiality may lead to a greater propensity to act as a
group, such as by taking the unusual step of sitting en banc.
E. Number of Judges
As noted above, one reason district courts have given for sitting
en banc is to save the judicial, governmental, and private re-
sources that would be used by having multiple judges separately
decide the same issue.1 19 The degree to which sitting en banc can
save parties' or judges' resources may be affected by the number
of judges in the district. Each time a judge heard challenges to
the Guidelines' constitutionality, the parties had to present their
arguments to the judge in writing and/or orally. An en banc pro-
ceeding allows all the judges in a district to hear oral argument at
the same time and to read the same briefs, thus potentially con-
serving parties' resources by requiring only one set of arguments
for the entire district. The more judges in a district, the greater
the potential resource savings from being able to present argu-
ments to all the judges at the same time.
Sitting en banc is less likely to conserve judges' time, however;
all the judges still must hear oral argument and read the parties'
briefs. In fact, en banc consideration of the constitutionality of the
Guidelines may require greater judicial time, because if no en
banc hearing occurred, then some judges in the district likely
would have been able to avoid deciding the Guidelines' constitu-
tionality before the Supreme Court of the United States settled
the issue. Indeed, in most districts that did not sit en banc, less
than half the judges ruled on the Guidelines' constitutionality.12 °
117. Although most judges of the United States District Court for the Central District
of California had their chambers in Los Angeles, the en banc hearing was held in nearby
Pasadena because no courtroom in Los Angeles was large enough. See supra note 9.
118. Edwards, supra note 17, at 1675 ("Having the entire circuit's chambers in the
same building ... can also be immensely helpful [in building collegiality].").
119. See supra text accompanying note 53.
120. At the time of the decisions regarding the Guidelines' constitutionality, there were
389 judges in the fifty-three district courts that did not sit en banc despite having at least
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In addition, more effort is likely required to write a decision ac-
ceptable to a majority of an en banc panel than one acceptable to
a single judge. The decision must be circulated among all the
judges in the district for comments and often must be revised in
light of these comments.121
For all these reasons, the more judges there are in a district,
the greater may be the expenditure of judicial resources caused
by an en banc hearing. In addition, the logistics of gathering all
the judges together to hear oral argument and discuss the case
likely becomes more complicated as the number of judges in a dis-
trict increases.
On the other hand, an en banc decision might save judicial re-
sources by allowing some judges who would have published an
opinion regarding the Guidelines' constitutionality to simply join
the decision of another judge instead. The more judges in the dis-
trict, the greater this potential resource savings. Such savings
may be insignificant, however, because judges have great discre-
tion regarding whether to publish or even write an opinion, so
judges with too little time might have chosen not to write an opin-
ion anyway.122
Finally, as noted above, more collegial district courts may be
more likely to meet en banc.'23 Many judges have argued that ju-
dicial collegiality is more difficult to attain in courts with a larger
number of judges.'24 Therefore, district courts with more judges
may be less collegial, and thus less likely to sit en banc than are
district courts with fewer judges. The negative effect on collegial-
ity of having more judges may even occur in districts with rela-
one judge in the district decide the Guidelines' constitutionality. 680 F. Supp. VII-XXX
(1988). Only 187 of those 389 judges ruled on the Guidelines' constitutionality. See supra
text accompanying note 88. Note that one of these judges issued two decisions; therefore,
188 decisions were issued by 187 judges. Sisk et al., supra note 12, at 1409.
121. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 18, at 1019.
122. In fact, all else equal, district judges with a greater caseload-and thus who were
busier-were less likely to publish their opinions on the Guidelines' constitutionality.
Taha, supra note 12, at 20.
123. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
124. COFFIN, supra note 17, at 216 ("The threatened dilution of collegiality in federal
courts has led some to propose capping the numbers of appellate and trial judges."); Ed-
wards, supra note 17, at 1674-75 ("Many judges are convinced that collegiality enables
better decisions, and that smaller courts tend to be more collegial. I agree."); Diarmuid F.
O'Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit Split Study Commission: Now What?, 57 MONT. L. REV. 313,
315 (1996) ("As the court of appeals continues to grow, it becomes increasingly difficult to
maintain the collegiality necessary for the court to do its job.").
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tively few judges. As Judge Harrison Winter stated, "[i]t's easy to
sit down with three judges and feel a closeness of association;
when you become five, that closeness is somewhat diluted, more
so when you become seven, still more when you are nine." 25
F. Caseload
If hearing a case en banc requires more judicial resources, bus-
ier judges should be less likely to hear a case en banc. Therefore,
a higher caseload--defined as the number of weighted cases 2 ' per
year per judge in the district-may reduce a district's propensity
to sit en banc.
G. Judicial Turnover
As discussed above, collegial districts may be more likely to
meet en banc.' 27 In addition, a number of judges have stated that
familiarity with one's colleagues is important to creating collegi-
ality. 12' Thus, districts with more stable judicial composition may
be more collegial, because the judges will have known and inter-
acted with each other for longer. Thus, all else equal, the longer
since a new judge has joined the district court, the more collegial
the court may be, and therefore the more likely the court will sit
en banc.
For the reasons discussed, all the variables in Table 1 might af-
fect the likelihood that districts sat en banc to decide the Guide-
lines' constitutionality. It should be noted, however, that other
factors that could not be examined in this Article also may affect
125. Harrison L. Winter, Goodwill and Dedication, in THE FEDERAL APPELLATE
JUDICIARY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 167 (Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler
eds., 1989).
126. The amount of time a judge typically spends on a case differs by case type. There-
fore, to measure workload more accurately, the Judicial Conference uses a case weighting
system that takes these differences into account. A. Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques of Case
Management: The Challenge of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
877,886 n.45 (1993).
127. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
128. COFFIN, supra note 17, at 221 (noting that collegiality is enhanced when judges
are conscious of their colleagues' "values and philosophies as years of service together have
revealed them"); Charles Clark, A Healthy and Diverse Judiciary, in THE FEDERAL
APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 163 (Cynthia Harrison & Russell R.
Wheeler eds., 1989) ("Contact [between judges] is important to collegiality.").
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the propensity to sit en banc. For example, some of the inter-
viewed judges credited the high quality of their district's chief
judge as being a factor. 129 They saw their chief judges' leadership
as being important to their districts' decisions to sit en banc. 130 In
addition, the collegiality in a district is likely affected by the indi-
vidual personalities of the judges in the district. 3' Like the qual-
ity of the chief judge, however, such a factor cannot be measured
easily and thus is not included in this Article's empirical analysis.
IV. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS
The last Part of this Article examines the variables that meas-
ure possible panel effects and that may be correlated with the
likelihood that a particular district sat en banc to decide the
Guidelines' constitutionality. To determine whether these vari-
ables are related to sitting en banc, the values of these variables
in districts that sat en banc are compared to their values in dis-
tricts that did not do so.
Table 2 gives the mean value of each of the variables in Table 1
for those districts that sat en banc and for those districts in which
judges individually decided the Guidelines' constitutionality. In
addition, the third column presents the p-value132 for the test of
the null hypothesis that both types of districts have the same
mean value of the particular variable.'33
129. See supra note 9. In federal district courts, the chief judge is generally the active
judge with the longest tenure who is under sixty-five years of age and has never served as
the chief judge before. 28 U.S.C. § 136(a) (2000).
130. See supra note 9. Chief judges have been credited with importance in creating col-
legiality in courts of appeals as well. Edwards, supra note 17, at 1670-74 (stating the im-
portance of the circuit's chief judge in promoting collegiality and describing how some chief
judges have done so); Winter, supra note 125, at 167-68 (stating that a chief judge can en-
courage collegiality by "exercis[ing] moral leadership and persuasion, verbally and by ex-
ample").
131. Edwards, supra note 17, at 1677 ("One judge alone probably cannot destroy colle-
giality on a court, because of the various ways in which the group can successfully bring
him or her into the fold of institutional norms. But a few uncompromising personalities,
together, can distract a court from its mission.").
132. The p-value indicates if the difference between the means of the variable for en
banc districts and for the non-en banc districts is statistically significant. See MICHAEL 0.
FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 120 (2d ed. 2001). A p-value of .05
or less means that the difference between the means is significant at a ninety-five percent
confidence level. See id. at 166-71. A p-value of .10 or less means that the difference be-
tween the means is significant at a ninety percent confidence level. See id.
133. For a discussion relating to testing of a null hypothesis, see id. at 120-22.
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Table 2: Means of Variables
Variable En Banc Non-En Banc p-valueDistricts Districts
Unanimity 0.6429 0.3143 .0538 *
Strike Guidelines 0.7143 0.3962 .0406 **
Criminal Cases 463.7143 485.9811 .8717
Same City 0.4286 0.2642 .3249
Number of Judges 6.7143 6.8887 .9054
Caseload 469.9286 463.4528 .8375
Judicial Turnover 1133.4300 888.3962 .3298
* Difference between en banc and non-en banc districts is statistically sig-
nificant at a 90% confidence level
** Difference between en banc and non-en banc districts is statistically
significant at a 95% confidence level
Because some of the variables may not be independent of each
other, additional analysis is also necessary. For example, if dis-
tricts that have a large number of criminal cases also tend to
have a large number of judges, then Table 2 will not accurately
show the effect of these variables on the likelihood of sitting en
banc. Thus, in addition, a multivariate analysis is used to calcu-
late the effect of a change in one variable when all the other vari-
ables are held constant. Specifically, a logistic regression is run of
a dependent variable-whether the district sat en banc-against
all of the variables and an intercept term."' The regression re-
sults are presented in Table 3, and the estimated coefficients are
134. A logistic regression is appropriate because the dependent variable has only two
possible values: a district either sat en banc or it did not do so. See id. at 458-59; see also
G.S. MADDALA, LIMITED-DEPENDENT AND QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN ECONOMETRICS 22-
27 (1983) (describing logistic regressions).
2005] 1261
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
transformed in Table 4 to measure the variables' effect on the
probability of sitting en banc. 135
Overall, the results are consistent with the expectations dis-
cussed above. Despite the small number of observations, all of the
estimated coefficients in Table 3 have the predicted signs (where
such a prediction existed) and one is even statistically significant.
In addition, thirteen judges who participated in the Guidelines'
en banc decisions were interviewed. The interviews included at
least one judge from eleven of the fourteen districts that sat en
banc. These interviews further confirmed that many of the vari-
ables affect the propensity of districts to sit en banc. 136
Table 3: Determinants of Sitting En Banc-Logit Estimates
Variable Co-efficient Standard Error p-value
Intercept -3.5038 ** 1.7706 0.0478
Unanimity 1.8835 * 1.0523 0.0735
Strike Guidelines 0.9195 0.7591 0.2258
Criminal Cases 0.0009 0.0009 0.3130
Same City 0.2049 0.7175 0.7752
Number of Judges 0.0563 0.0867 0.5159
Caseload -0.0011 0.0033 0.7482
Judicial Turnover 0.0003 0.0004 0.4841
n=67 Log-Likelihood = -29.872 pseudo R = .1301
* Statistically significant at a 90% confidence level
•* Statistically significant at a 95% confidence level
135. The probabilities are calculated by setting each variable equal to its mean value.
136. See supra note 9.
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Table 4: Effect on Probability of Sitting En Banc
Difference in
Variable Probability of
Sitting En Banc
Unanimity 13 7  28.9%
(Differing Views v. No Differing Views)
Strike Guidelines 138  13.3%
(Majority of Judges Find the Guidelines Unconstitutional)
Criminal Cases 139  5.8%
(708.07 cases v. 254.58 cases)
Same City140  3.0%
(All judges' chambers in same city)
Number of Judges1 4 1 3.8%
(9.27 judges v. 4.44 judges)
Caseload1
4 2
(516.77 cases v. 412.85 cases)
Judicial Turnover 143  3.4%
(1354.68 days v. 524.51 days)
137. The effect of the Unanimity variable is measured by the change in the probability
of sitting en banc ifjudges in the district who expressed a view on the Guidelines constitu-
tionality were unanimous in that view (i.e., Unanimity=1) versus if judges expressed dif-
fering views (i.e., Unanimity=O).
138. The effect of the Strike Guidelines variable is measured by the change in the prob-
ability of sitting en banc if the majority of judges in the district who expressed a view on
the Guidelines' constitutionality found the Guidelines unconstitutional (i.e., Strike Guide-
lines= 1) versus if the majority did not do so (i.e., Strike Guidelines=0).
139. The effect of the number of Criminal Cases is measured by the difference in the
probability of sitting en banc when the value of the variable is its mean plus one-half
standard deviation, versus when its value is its mean minus one-half standard deviation.
140. The effect of the Same City variable on the probability of publication is measured
by calculating the difference in the probability of sitting en banc when all the judges'
chambers are in the same city (i.e., Same City=1) versus when the judges' chambers are in
different cities (Same City=O).
141. The effect of the Number of Judges in the district is measured by the difference in
the probability of sitting en banc when the value of the variable is its mean plus one-half
standard deviation, versus when its value is its mean minus one-half standard deviation.
142. The effect of the judges' Caseload is measured by the difference in the probability
of sitting en banc when the value of the variable is its mean plus one-half standard devia-
tion, versus when its value is its mean minus one-half standard deviation.
143. The effect of Judicial Turnover is measured by the difference in the probability of
sitting en banc when the value of the variable is its mean plus one-half standard devia-
tion, versus when its value is its mean minus one-half standard deviation.
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A. Unanimity
Districts sitting en banc were much more likely to be unani-
mous regarding the Guidelines' constitutionality. All else equal,
districts in which the judges were unanimous regarding the
Guidelines' constitutionality were a statistically significant 28.9%
more likely to sit en banc than were districts in which judges ex-
pressed differing views.144
As discussed above, several possible explanations for this re-
sult exist. 4 ' The process of hearing a case en banc may have
made judges more likely to be unanimous. For example, some
judges on a panel may have been genuinely persuaded by their
colleagues regarding the constitutionality of the Guidelines. In
addition, some potential dissenters may have engaged in go-along
voting, either out of a desire for uniform sentencing practices in
the district, or simply to avoid having to write a dissenting opin-
ion. On the other hand, districts that were more likely to be
unanimous may have been more likely to have chosen to sit en
banc. For example, more collegial districts may have been more
likely to sit en banc, and this collegiality may also have encour-
aged the development of a real consensus among the judges re-
garding the Guidelines' constitutionality. In addition, districts in
which there was a feeling that the judges had common views on
the Guidelines' constitutionality may have been more likely to
choose to sit en banc.
Interviews of judges clarify which explanations likely are most
responsible for this result. Although judges in some districts
stated that earlier conversations with other judges in their dis-
trict allowed them to gauge how many of their colleagues felt
about the Guidelines, no judge believed that this knowledge was
a factor in the decision to sit en banc.14
6
In addition, all interviewed judges believed that there was not
even implicit pressure to go along with the majority's decision on
the Guidelines' constitutionality. 147 Still, many said that when the
en banc hearing was called, it was hoped that the decision would
be unanimous so that there would be a uniform sentencing policy
in the district. 14 Indeed, the desire for uniformity was one of the
144. See supra Table 4.
145. See supra Part III.A.
146. See supra note 9.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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two reasons that the interviewed judges cited for choosing to sit
en banc.' 49 If a purpose of sitting en banc was to obtain uniformity
in the district, it is reasonable to expect that some judges felt at
least an implicit pressure to reach a unanimous decision. Indeed,
although none of the interviewed judges were aware of any go-
along voting in their district, a few acknowledged that it was pos-
sible it had occurred. 150
Even pressure for uniformity need not necessarily discourage
dissent, however. For example, in two districts that sat en banc,
dissenting judges explicitly stated in their dissenting opinions
that they disagreed with the majority's decision but, for the sake
of uniformity in the district's sentencing practices, they would
adopt the majority's approach toward the Guidelines." 1 Neverthe-
less, the desire to avoid having to write a dissenting opinion may
have deterred such a practice, especially because it was expected
that the Supreme Court of the United States would soon decide
the issue anyway.5 2
The second reason that interviewed judges gave for sitting en
banc was that they desired the input of their colleagues on a very
important issue: the Guidelines' constitutionality. 53 This sug-
gests that judges in districts that chose to sit en banc might be
particularly receptive to being persuaded by their colleagues.
This interest in their colleagues' views can be considered an
application of Condorcet's Jury Theorem.5 That theorem states:
Suppose that there are n voters who must decide between two alter-
natives, one 6f which is correct and the other incorrect. Assume that
the probability that any given voter will vote for the correct alterna-
tive is greater than 1/2. Then the probability that a majority vote will
select the correct alternative approaches 1 as the number of voters
gets large.
1 55
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. United States v. Macias-Pedroza, 694 F. Supp. 1406, 1419-20 (D. Ariz. 1988)
(Rosenblatt, J., dissenting); United States v. Ortega Lopez, 684 F. Supp. 1506, 1515 (C.D.
Cal. 1988) (Hupp, J., dissenting).
152. Recall, that to speed its determination of the Guidelines' constitutionality, the Su-
preme Court of the United States took the unusual step of granting certiorari before the
court of appeals had issued a judgment in the case. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361,371 (1989).
153. See supra note 9.
154. Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 327, 328 (2002).
155. Id.
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Assuming that each judge is more likely than not to rule correctly
on the Guidelines' constitutionality, Condorcet's Jury Theorem
implies that a majority of an en banc panel is even more likely to
rule correctly than is an individual judge. Thus if a judge is faced
with a strong majority of their colleagues that hold one view on
the Guidelines' constitutionality, a judge might be inclined to be-
lieve that this majority is correct, and thus may be more likely to
be persuaded by those judges.
A number of the interviewed judges also expressed the belief
that their courts were especially collegial, and that this collegial-
ity contributed to the decision to sit en banc.156 This greater colle-
giality may have either directly or indirectly caused the greater
unanimity in the en banc decisions. Collegiality might indirectly
encourage unanimity simply by encouraging the use of en banc
panels. If more collegial courts are more likely to meet en banc,
and if being on a panel encourages potential dissenting judges to
vote the same as the majority does, then more collegial courts
should be more likely to be unanimous.
Collegiality likely also more directly caused greater unanimity.
As discussed above, many judges believe that in a collegial court,
judges sincerely listen to, and are willing to be persuaded by, the
views of their colleagues.'57 Thus, a more collegial court may have
more unanimous decisions than a less collegial court because the
judges are more likely to allow themselves to be genuinely per-
suaded by their colleagues.158
This type of unanimity should be contrasted to unanimity ob-
tained when a potential dissenting judge instead engages in go-
along voting. As Judge Edwards points out, "[iun a collegial envi-
ronment, divergent views are more likely to gain a full airing in
the deliberative process-judges go back and forth in their delib-
erations over disputed and difficult issues until agreement is
156. See supra note 9.
157. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
158. See COFFIN, supra note 17, at 214 (stating that keeping an open mind about cases
is important to collegiality and that "nothing is more disheartening than to hear a col-
league in opening discussions [about a case], say, 'Nothing's going to change my mind'");
id. at 224-25 (calling a court's long history of unanimous opinions "a testament to the effi-
cacy of real collegial interaction in reaching a result all can accept").
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reached. This is not a matter of one judge 'compromising' his or
her views to a prevailing majority."159
Other judges have noted that in a collegial environment this
deliberative process can result in a compromise decision to which
all the judges can agree, rather than resulting in judges being
persuaded by the arguments of their colleagues. 16' Even such
compromises, however, should not be troublesome. Panel deci-
sions are, by definition, the decision of a panel, not of individual
judges. Thus, only a decision that can command the support of a
majority of a panel can become the law. 161
The en banc decisions regarding the constitutionality of the
Guidelines are unlikely to have been compromise decisions, at
least regarding the ultimate question in the case-whether the
Guidelines are constitutional. The judges had to decide whether
or not to apply the Guidelines to criminal cases in their district;
no compromise position was available.
In addition, it is debatable if even blatant go-along voting is
undesirable in general. As noted above, a judge may go along
with the majority on a panel to avid having to spend time writ-
ing a dissent about an issue the judge does not feel particularly
strongly about or that is not of great public importance.162 In such
circumstances, arguably the judge's-and the judge's clerks'-
time is better spent on tasks other than writing a dissent. 163 Also,
many judges believe:
159. Edwards, supra note 17, at 1646; see also COFFIN, supra note 17, at 221 (recalling
that "on a significant number of occasions [upon receiving a draft opinion from a col-
league], responding judges have been able to present a new way of looking at a case, or a
hitherto overlooked case authority, or some undervalued fact or procedural point, and...
a writing judge has gracefully changed course").
160. COFFIN, supra note 17, at 214 (stating that, because judges on a panel must
achieve a consensus, "[niot only must [they] be prepared to live with a certain restraint on
their style, but they must compromise on many matters of substance. They write for not
just themselves but others also."); Wald, supra note 18, at 178-79 ("Colleagues who are
perennially annoyed and irritated with one another have difficulty listening respectfully
and open-mindedly to each other; they have little incentive to seek a middle ground.").
161. COFFIN, supra note 17, at 220 (observing that "[t]he whole idea behind appellate
courts is that a collection of different minds is better able to perceive error and to guide
the development of the law than is one mind").
162. See supra text accompanying note 103; see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on
Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 142 (1990) (noting that in the distribution
among the judges on a court of opinions to be written, dissenting and concurring opinions
do not count, thus "[dlissents or concurrences are written on one's own time").
163. COFFIN, supra note 17, at 226 (advising judges considering writing a concurring
opinion to "weigh the time involved and decide whether a separate opinion is worth the
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[d]issents and concurrences need to be saved for major matters if the
Court is not to appear indecisive and quarrelsome, [because] the ap-
pearance of indecision and quarrelsomeness are drains on the energy
of the institution, leaving it in weakened condition at those moments
when the call upon it for public leadership is greatest.
164
It is believed that judges such as Justice Louis Brandeis and Jus-
tice Benjamin Cardozo often ultimately engaged in go-along vot-
ing out of this concern.165 This concern, however, is much less ap-
plicable to district courts because they very rarely issue group
decisions.
Finally, however, it should be noted that some have argued
that a more collegial environment might actually lead to more
dissents.166 Some social science studies suggest that when a group
of people are more familiar with each other, they will also feel
more comfortable disagreeing with each other.167 The evidence
presented in this Article, however, supports the conclusion that
greater collegiality leads to fewer dissenting opinions.
B. Majority Vote to Strike Down Guidelines
Districts in which a majority of judges voted to strike down the
Guidelines were much more likely to sit en banc. 6 ' As displayed
in Table 4, all else equal, districts in which most judges found the
Guidelines unconstitutional were 13.3% more likely to sit en banc
sacrifice to your regular opinion load"); Taha, supra note 12, at 20 (finding that district
court judges in courts with a greater caseload are less likely to publish their decisions,
which indicates that time spent publishing decisions at least partly reduces the time
judges spend on their other cases).
164. Ginsburg, supra note 162, at 143 (quoting John P. Frank, Book Review, 10 J. LE-
GAL ED. 401, 404 (1958) (reviewing A. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR.
JUSTICE BRANDEIS (1957))); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CHALLENGE AND REFORM 354 (1996) ("Abuse [of another judge] in opinions is not only a
distraction to the reader but also lowers the reputation of the judiciary in the eyes of the
public.... ."); Wald, supra note 18, at 179 (stating that perceived personal feuds between
judges can cause "public distrust or disenchantment" with the judicial process); Winter,
supra note 125, at 169 (the public's confidence in, and acceptance of, courts' decisions are
undermined by intemperate dissents).
165. See Ginsburg, supra note 162, at 142-43.
166. See Edwards, supra note 17, at 1646-47.
167. See id.
168. See supra Table 4.
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than were other districts.169 Given that only fourteen of the sixty-
seven districts-20.9%-sat en banc, this is a very large effect.17°
This result likely has two related causes. First, districts in
which many judges suspected that they would find the Guidelines
unconstitutional may have been more likely to choose to meet en
banc. Second, being in a panel likely made many judges more
willing to strike down the Guidelines.
As noted above, in the interviews of judges one of the two rea-
sons cited for sitting en banc was to obtain the input of col-
leagues.171 Finding the Guidelines unconstitutional-a dramatic
change in federal sentencing policy-is a major action by a judge.
In addition, the political popularity of the Guidelines at the time
made striking down the Guidelines seem even more serious. In-
deed, judges who had a greater chance of promotion to a court of
appeals were more likely to uphold the Guidelines.'72 Thus some
cautious judges who believed they were likely to strike down the
Guidelines may have been more desirous of the counsel of their
colleagues before doing so. In addition, some judges may have be-
lieved that their voting only as part of a panel to hold the Guide-
lines unconstitutional may give them more political cover than if
they had instead struck down the Guidelines on their own.
For the same reasons, sitting on an en banc panel may have
made some judges feel more comfortable striking down the Guide-
lines. Judges whose colleagues also voted to strike down the
Guidelines may have felt more empowered to do so as well, be-
cause the vote confirmed their own views, and it provided them
some political cover.
C. Number of Criminal Cases
District courts with more criminal cases were more likely to sit
en banc, although this result is not statistically significant. 7 3 All
else equal, having 708 criminal cases rather than 255 criminal
cases in the district led to a 5.8% greater probability of deciding
169. See supra Table 4.
170. See supra text accompanying note 88.
171. See supra note 9 and text accompanying note 153.
172. Cohen, supra note 12, at 193; Sisk et al., supra note 12, at 1490.
173. See supra Table 4.
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the Guidelines' constitutionality en banc. 174 It should be recalled,
however, that only 20.9% of the districts sat en banc, 171 so even a
small change in the absolute probability of sitting en banc is large
in relative terms.
As discussed above, districts with a greater number of criminal
cases were expected to have been more likely to have sat en banc,
because the Guidelines would affect more cases in those districts
and because the benefit of uniform sentencing policies among
judges would be greater in those districts. 176 In fact, for these rea-
sons, two of the interviewed judges predicted that the number of
criminal cases in a district would be the primary factor that ex-
plained which districts sat en banc. 7 7 Indeed, in its en banc deci-
sion, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, which has a large number of criminal cases, explicitly
stated that "Ib]ecause of the paramount importance of the issue to
this district in particular, as well as our desire to promote proce-
dural uniformity and avoid disparate sentencing, we decided to
hear these cases en banc."17"
D. All Judges' Chambers in Same City
All else equal, districts in which all the judges' chambers were
in the same city were a little more likely (three percent) to sit en
banc than were districts in which judges' chambers were in dif-
ferent cities, although this result is not statistically significant.179
As discussed above, two possible explanations exist for this find-
ing.' First, as judges' geographic proximity increases, the logis-
tical difficulties of hearing and deciding a case en banc are re-
duced. Second, judges who are geographically closer are more
likely to interact regularly with each other and thus may form a
greater collegiality, leading to a higher propensity to act as a
group by sitting en banc.
174. See supra Table 4.
175. See supra text accompanying note 88.
176. See supra Part III.C.
177. See supra note 9.
178. United States v. Bogle, 689 F. Supp. 1121, 1123-24 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (first empha-
sis added).
179. See supra Table 4.
180. See supra Part III.D.
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The interviews with judges indicate that both explanations are
likely valid. Some judges believed that a geographically diverse
district would be less likely to meet en banc because of the travel
burden that it would impose on distant judges."8 ' A number of
judges placed at least equal emphasis on the fact that geographic
proximity results in greater collegiality.112 They pointed to, as an
example, the fact that having all judges in the same city encour-
ages more frequent judges' meetings.8 3 In fact, several judges be-
lieved that the idea of deciding the Guidelines' constitutionality
en banc first arose at their district's regularly scheduled judges'
meeting."14
Many judges also emphasized the importance of less official
meetings in building collegiality. 185 For example, one judge at-
tributed the high collegiality in his district largely to the fact that
being in the same location allows the judges to often have lunch
with half their colleagues one day and the other half the next
day.8 6 Many judges on courts of appeals also believe that infor-
mal contact between judges is important to establishing and
maintaining collegiality.'' For example, to help build collegiality,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has luncheons for the judges and a dinner each term for
the judges and their spouses.'
Interestingly, judges do not all share the belief that contact in-
creases collegiality. One interviewed judge stated that he believes
absence makes the heart grow fonder: judges who see each other
181. As one judge said, "[w]e wouldn't want to make ol' Harry come all the way down
here [to hear a case en banc." See supra note 9.
182. E.g., supra note 9.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Murphy, supra note 20, at 459 (stating that collegiality in courts of appeals is en-
hanced by judges "frequently din[ing] together and otherwise socializ[ing] when they are
gathered for terms of court"); Wald, supra note 18, at 181 (encouraging judges to socialize
with each other to foster collegiality); Winter, supra note 125, at 168 (emphasizing the
positive effect that judges eating together has on collegiality in the Fourth Circuit).
188. Edwards, supra note 17, at 1672. Public figures of interest to the judges, such as
Washington Redskins owner Daniel Snyder, are also sometimes invited to the luncheons.
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less frequently are generally more collegial.'8 9 Some courts of ap-
peals judges have expressed the same opinion.1 90
The effect of a court's structure on judicial collegiality has been
widely debated, especially after the Commission on Structural Al-
ternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals recommended orga-
nizing the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
into three smaller, regionally based adjudicative divisions.19
Some in favor of the proposal argued that a more geographically
compact court with fewer judges would have greater collegiality,
which is necessary to maintain a consistent, coherent body of law
throughout the circuit.' 92 Some opponents of the proposal dis-
puted that a relationship between court structure and collegiality
exists, and argued that the large, geographically wide Ninth Cir-
cuit was sufficiently collegial. 93
This Article's results suggest that geographic proximity leads
to more frequent interaction between judges, which at least mar-
ginally fosters collegiality. At the district court level, this collegi-
ality appears to lead to a greater propensity to decide a case en
banc.
Judges' increasing use of technology may reduce the impor-
tance of geographic proximity in maintaining collegiality. 194
Technological advances such as email and telephone and video
conferencing can facilitate interaction between judges who are
geographically distant. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that such
technology can ever fully replicate the effect of face-to-face inter-
action among judges that occurs in a geographically centralized
court. In fact, to the extent that technology such as video confer-
189. See supra note 9.
190. JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS: THE IMPACT OF COURT
ORGANIZATION ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
160 (2002).
191. COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL
REP. 40 (1998).
192. See, e.g., Eric J. Gribbin, Note, California Split: A Plan to Divide the Ninth Cir-
cuit, 47 DUKE L.J. 351, 381-82 (1998); Procter Hug, Jr. & Carl Tobias, A Preferable Ap-
proach for the Ninth Circuit, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1657, 1660 (2000); Jennifer E. Spreng, The
Icebox Cometh: A Former Clerk's View of the Proposed Ninth Circuit Split, 73 WASH. L.
REV. 875, 912-13 (1998).
193. Hug & Tobias, supra note 192, at 1660.
194. COHEN, supra note 190, at 156 ("[Mlany [court of appeals] judges indicated that
the increasing relevance of instant communication through electronic mail went some dis-
tance toward moderating the negative effects of geographic dispersion."); Edwards, supra
note 17, at 1676.
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encing replaces face-to-face interaction, it may actually under-
mine collegiality. 195 Similarly, email can reduce oral conversa-
tions and may encourage indelicate correspondence196 or misun-
derstandings that could harm collegiality. 197
E. Number of Judges
Districts with more judges were more likely to sit en banc. All
else equal, a district with 9.3 judges had a 3.8% greater probabil-
ity of sitting en banc than did a district with 4.4 judges, although
this difference is not statistically significant. 198 As discussed
above, in theory, in districts with more judges en banc proceed-
ings would save more resources of litigants but have a less clear
effect on the expenditure of judicial resources. 199 Thus, the proper
interpretation of this result is not obvious.
For example, it may indicate that saving litigants' resources is
a factor in judges' decisions to sit en banc, and that en banc hear-
ings do not affect significantly the expenditure of judicial re-
sources. On the other hand, it could mean that en banc proceed-
ings save judicial resources as well as litigants' resources.
Alternatively, it may suggest that even if sitting en banc requires
more judicial resources, it is more than offset by savings in liti-
gants' resources. Finally, it may even indicate that courts do not
consider the effect on judicial resources of sitting en banc. This fi-
nal interpretation is less plausible because, as discussed above,
saving judges' time likely was part of the reason that district
courts were more likely to sit en banc if all the judges' chambers
were in the same city.
20 0
Also, recall that there is evidence that more collegial courts are
more likely to sit en banc. As discussed above, it is reasonable to
believe that courts with fewer judges are more collegial than are
195. Murphy, supra note 20, at 458.
196. Id. at 460 (stating that because e-mail may be "perceived as essentially a substi-
tute for, if not interchangeable with, oral conversation, it is often not used with the same
thoughtful reflection as a more traditional written memorandum").
197. Id. at 459 ("The phone and personal conversation are more forgiving [than e-mail],
as they allow for voice inflection and immediate defusing of misinterpreted remarks and
do not produce a written record.").
198. See supra Table 4.
199. See supra Part III.E.
200. See supra Part IV.D.
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courts with more judges." 1 Indeed, in the debate over changing
the structure of the Ninth Circuit, some argue that the large
number of judges in the Ninth Circuit is harming collegiality. °2
This Article's results do not suggest a clear relationship between
the number of judges and collegiality. In fact, all else equal, dis-
tricts with more judges actually were more likely to sit en banc.2 °3
One other possible explanation for this result exists. Recall
that the interviewed judges said that obtaining the input of their
colleagues regarding the Guidelines' constitutionality was one of
the primary reasons their districts chose to sit en banc. 204 As dis-
cussed above, assuming that each judge has a greater than fifty
percent chance of correctly deciding the question of the Guide-
lines' constitutionality, Condorcet's Jury Theorem implies that
the more judges who decide a case, the more likely that the ma-
jority of them will decide it correctly.2° Therefore, the more
judges in a district, the more likely that the majority of an en
banc panel in the district will rule correctly on the Guidelines'
constitutionality. Thus, input from one's colleagues is likely to be
more valuable in districts with more judges.
Finally, note that the number of judges in a court probably has
a greater effect on collegiality in courts of appeals than in district
courts. Federal district judges almost always individually decide
cases; courts of appeals judges generally decide cases as part of a
three-judge panel.206 Thus, in courts of appeals, much of the in-
teraction between judges that can affect collegiality occurs in
their hearing cases and issuing decisions together. Because pan-
els are randomly assigned, judges are assigned less frequently to
a panel containing another particular judge when the court has
more judges.20 7 Thus there is less opportunity to build collegiality
in larger courts of appeals.2 ' As Judge Coffin states, "[tihe differ-
ence in the collegial atmosphere between sitting with all of one's
201. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
202. Hug & Tobias, supra note 192, at 1660.
203. See supra Table 4. Of course, it is possible that larger courts are less collegial, but
this lesser collegiality is offset by the greater savings of litigants' resources from en banc
proceedings in larger courts.
204. See supra note 9 and text accompanying note 153.
205. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
207. COHEN, supra note 190, at 161.
208. Id.
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colleagues each month and sitting with each only once or twice or
even three times a year is enormous."20 9 In contrast, because fed-
eral district judges almost always decide cases individually, an
increase in the number of judges in a district should have less of
an effect on collegiality. 2
10
In addition, it should be cautioned that although this Article
finds that greater collegiality leads to district courts being more
likely to sit en banc, this relationship likely does not also exist in
appellate courts. Unlike in district courts, en banc proceedings in
courts of appeals are generally used to review the decision of a
three-judge panel.2 1' Thus, in a court of appeals, a high rate of en
banc review, rather than being a sign of collegiality, "can both re-
flect and feed a court's lack of confidence in the work of [three-
judge] panels."212
F. Caseload
Caseload per judge does not appear to have a substantial effect
on the propensity to sit en banc. All else equal, having approxi-
mately 104 more cases per judge reduced the probability of sitting
en banc by only a statistically insignificant 1.6%. 213
If sitting en banc was viewed as requiring more judicial re-
sources, then busier districts-defined as those with a higher
caseload-should be less likely to sit en banc. Thus the existence
of little, if any, relationship between caseload and the likelihood
209. COFFIN, supra note 17, at 216.
210. Id. at 214 (noting that although collegiality among judges in trial courts may be
important, it is "transcended by" the collegiality of appellate courts because appellate
judges decide cases as part of a panel rather than individually).
211. Ginsburg & Boynton, supra note 79, at 262.
212. Edwards, supra note 17, at 1680; see also Ginsburg & Boynton, supra note 79, at
260 (stating that a decline in the number of cases heard en banc might reflect a greater
collegiality in the court "in the sense that the judges, notwithstanding their different
views, had more confidence in each other's good faith and competence, and so deferred
more to judgments of panels on which they did not sit"); Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 18,
at 1021 ("[Elither too high or too low a rate of rehearing en banc could jeopardize the col-
legial atmosphere prevailing on the [District of Columbia Circuit] court."); Wald, supra
note 18, at 176, 180-81 (calling the en banc process in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit "a tense, even nasty, process" that poses the "greatest
risk" to collegiality, and advising fellow judges to "[t]hink hard before you vote to en banc;
your time will come, and judges have long memories").
213. See supra Table 4.
2005] 1275
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
of sitting en bane suggests that judges do not view sitting en bane
as significantly affecting the expenditure of judicial resources.
G. Judicial Turnover
Districts with less recent turnover were more likely to sit en
banc. All else equal, having not had any judges added to a district
in about twenty-seven months resulted in a 3.4% greater prob-
ability of sitting en banc, although this result was not statistically
significant.214
As discussed above, this result supports the conclusion that
familiarity with one's colleagues is important to building judicial
collegiality. All else equal, districts with no recent addition of
judges should be more collegial because there is no need to be-
come familiar with a new colleague.215 This greater collegiality
appears to result in a greater propensity to sit en banc.
V. CONCLUSION
Judges on a panel decide cases differently than they do indi-
vidually. Understanding these panel effects is essential to under-
standing and predicting judicial behavior. This Article uses a
unique natural experiment and interviews of judges to study
panel effects and to answer the related question of why judges
who have the authority to decide a case individually sometimes
instead choose to do so as part of a panel.
District courts rarely sit en banc. Fourteen districts, however,
sat en banc to decide the constitutionality of the Guidelines, while
in fifty-three other districts, judges instead individually decided
the issue.216 This Article discovers panel effects by comparing the
decisions of the judges in the districts that sat en banc to the de-
cisions of judges who sat individually. Supplementing this with a
comparison of the characteristics of districts that sat en banc with
214. See supra Table 4.
215. See supra text accompanying note 128; see also COFFIN supra note 17, at 214 (stat-
ing that a quality of collegiality is intimacy "resulting in a deep if selective knowledge of
one another," and that "[n]obody knows one's societal values, biases, and thought ways
better than a colleague").
216. See supra text accompanying note 88.
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those that did not do so also helps explain why some district
courts choose to sit en banc.
A primary panel effect is that judges on an en banc panel are
much more likely to reach a unanimous decision. This propensity
of panels to be unanimous is likely due to multiple factors. Judges
in a panel discuss the case with each other and thus may be more
likely to reach a consensus on the correct decision. In addition,
there is reason to believe that some judges engaged in go-along
voting to establish a uniform sentencing policy in the district or to
avoid writing a dissent.
This Article also finds that judges on a panel are more willing
to strike down a law or make a politically unpopular decision.
Judges who sat en banc were much more likely to find the politi-
cally popular Guidelines unconstitutional than were judges who
sat individually. This suggests that some judges can be embold-
ened when their colleagues vote with them.
These panel effects also help explain why some districts chose
to sit en banc: part of the purpose of sitting en banc was to obtain
these panel effects. For example, judges that especially desired
that their districts have a uniform policy regarding the Guide-
lines were more likely to have chosen to sit en banc, because do-
ing so would likely lead to uniformity in the district. In addition,
judges who were leaning toward striking down the Guidelines
may have been more likely to desire the input-and the possible
political cover-from their colleagues that would come from an en
banc hearing.
Many other factors also partly explain a district's propensity to
sit en banc. For example, many judges cited the desire for a uni-
form sentencing policy in their district as the primary reason for
deciding the Guidelines' constitutionality en banc. Indeed, the
number of criminal cases in the district-which should be posi-
tively correlated with the desirability of a uniform sentencing pol-
icy-was positively related to the likelihood of sitting en banc.
Because of the inherently small number of observations in this
study, the empirical results should not be overstated. These re-
sults, however, in combination with interviews of judges who par-
ticipated in the decisions, provide evidence of how judicial collegi-
ality and other factors affect courts' decision making. They also
give insight into how court structure and composition affect colle-
giality.
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Districts in which all judges' chambers were in the same city
were more likely to sit en banc. Part of the explanation for this
probably is the greater logistical difficulties in arranging an en
banc hearing by judges who are in different cities. The greater
collegiality that can develop from geographically close judges
regularly interacting with each other appears to be responsible
also. The effect of judges' geographic proximity on judicial collegi-
ality and on the propensity to sit en banc was debated when the
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals recommended organizing the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit into smaller adjudicative divisions.
This Article's results suggest that even relatively short distances
between judges may reduce collegiality and may deter the con-
vening of en banc panels.
There has also been much debate regarding the effect of the
number of judges on a court on judicial collegiality and the pro-
pensity to sit en banc. Interestingly, this Article found a positive
correlation between the number of judges and the likelihood of
sitting en banc. It is reasonable to expect that the presence of
more judges would impair collegiality and increase the logistical
difficulties in coordinating an en banc hearing. The Article's re-
sults suggest, however, that in district courts these considera-
tions are more than offset by the greater resource savings of liti-
gants (and possibly of judges) obtainable from en banc hearings in
districts with more judges. In addition, the more judges on a
court, the more beneficial obtaining the aggregate input of these
judges is likely to be.
Finally, this Article finds evidence that turnover in the judges
on a court reduces collegiality. Collegiality requires that judges be
familiar with each other; changing the judges on a court reduces
that familiarity.
Overall, this Article demonstrates the importance of under-
standing how judges are affected by their colleagues. Even federal
district judges, who normally decide cases individually, exhibit
panel effects, and court structure and composition can affect the
collegiality-and thus the decisions-of their courts.
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